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INTRODUCTION
For seventy-five years, Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing1 has
provided a one-line answer to choice-of-law questions in federal diversity
cases: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 requires the federal court to employ the same
law that a court of the state would select. The simplicity of the proposition
likely accounts for the unqualified breadth with which federal courts now
apply it. Choice of law doctrine is difficult, consensus in hard cases is elusive,
and the anxiety that Erie produces over the demands of federalism tends to
stifle any reexamination of core assumptions. The attraction of a simple
answer is obvious. But Klaxon cannot bear the weight with which it has been
loaded.
Like Erie itself, Klaxon combines a core ruling on the limits of federal
judicial power with a highly contextual statement of federal jurisdictional
policy. Unlike Erie, however, Klaxon has not benefited from a long line of
rulings mapping the boundaries of these respective principles. This doctrinal
desuetude is no longer sustainable following the enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA).3 CAFA effectuates a shift in the jurisdictional
policy of the federal courts that requires a critical examination of the meaning
and scope of Klaxon. And by moving increasing numbers of complex statelaw cases into federal proceedings that are then consolidated through the
multi-district litigation process, CAFA has created increased pressure to
undertake that reexamination.
This Article offers a general approach to analyzing choice of law and
jurisdictional policy in the federal courts. It begins by placing the spare
language of Klaxon in analytical context and tracing the multiple lines of
doctrine that intersect in the ruling. Those doctrines were undergoing a
transformation at the time the Court issued its decision, yet the Klaxon Court
confined its analysis narrowly, a fact that speaks to the limited scope of its
holding. The Article then describes the relationship between federal
jurisdictional policy and the elements of modern choice of law and maps the
jurisdictional changes that Congress effectuated with CAFA and amplified
with the MDL statute. Those changes represent a departure from the policies
of the general diversity statute and render some of the core assumptions of
the Erie doctrine inapposite. The central conclusion of this Article is that
federal courts hearing complex cases under the jurisdiction of these
specialized federal statutes have the power to develop independent federal

313 U.S. 487 (1941).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012)).
1
2
3
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answers to one key component of the choice-of-law calculus: how to resolve
conflicts between the laws of multiple interested states when each would
apply its own law to a dispute. Whether federal courts should exercise that power
as a matter of policy is a question that this Article leaves for future examination.
What is clear, however, is that Klaxon does not hold sway in this class of cases.
I. ERIE AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. The Shift in the Landscape that Surrounded Erie
To appreciate the limited nature of Klaxon’s ruling, one must begin by
reading the opinion against the analytical upheaval that was underway at the
time it was written and compare the narrowness with which the Court spoke
in Klaxon to the broad exploration of this shifting landscape that it undertook
in contemporaneous rulings. When the Court rejected Swift v. Tyson, it set
the stage for the creation of modern federal common law. That stage, in turn,
provided the proscenium for a reframing of choice-of-law analysis that was
already underway.
The 1930s and 1940s were a transformative period in the relationship
between state and federal courts. In a handful of years, the business of federal
courts sitting in diversity underwent a complete reversal. The era of the
Conformity Act4 and Swift v. Tyson,5 under which federal diversity courts
would apply state law to most questions of procedure but general federal
common law to many questions relating to liability, came to an end. In its
place came the new dispensation of the Rules Enabling Act6 and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which established the first uniform law of federal
procedure for actions at law, and Erie, which eradicated the general federal
common law and recognized state common-law courts as authoritative
expositors of liability rules.
At the same time, choice of law was poised for a revolution. In 1934 and
1935, the work of Joseph Beale culminated, respectively, in the publication of
the American Law Institute’s (ALI) First Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
which Beale drafted,7 and a treatise on the subject published under Beale’s
own name.8 Both works sought to preserve and valorize a rule-based,
territorial, vested-rights approach to choice-of-law analysis, but these holding
actions quickly proved unsustainable. In 1942, Walter Wheeler Cook
published The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, his magnificent
4
5
6
7
8

Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255 § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
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account of legal method and purposive interpretation in conflicts analysis.9
The work of Cook, his contemporary Ernest Lorenzen and successor David
Cavers prefigured the more widely-credited work of Brainerd Currie, which
would dramatically shift the paradigm of the field twenty years later10—a shift
in paradigm that had in fact been quietly set in motion in the 1930s when the
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that bookended Beale’s work like
harbingers, defining the constitutional limits on choice of law in terms of state
interests and avoidance of unfair surprise.11 The Court’s iconic 1945 ruling in
International Shoe v. Washington,12 effectuating a similar shift in the cognate
field of personal jurisdiction that rejected the strict territorialism of
Pennoyer v. Neff13 in favor of an approach based on state interests and
fundamental fairness, came shortly thereafter.
Developments in the field of federal jurisdiction were also underway.
Between 1891 and 1925, Congress implemented a series of reforms that
established the system of intermediate circuit courts of appeal with which we
are familiar today, unifying the nisi prius work of the federal bench into
district courts that would thereafter serve as the exclusive courts of original
federal jurisdiction for most purposes while giving the circuit courts the last
word in most cases and alleviating a decades-long crisis in the workload of
the Supreme Court.14 In the 1920s, motivated in part by this sea change in
the structure of the federal judicial system, leading thinkers like Felix
Frankfurter and Charles Warren, and also a young Henry Friendly, produced
scholarly treatments of the jurisdictional policies of the newly refashioned

9 WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
The book consisted of an edited collection of previously published essays along with several new
additions. The most famous of the previously published works and the intellectual foundation for
the project was an essay published in the Yale Law Journal for which the book became an eponym.
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924). As
Professor Cavers wrote in a review of the book, Cook’s original essay was a “dramatic triumph over
the ‘territorial’ and ‘vested rights’ theories” that “stormed his objectives by frontal assault.”
David F. Cavers, Cook: The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1170,
1170-71 (1943) (book review).
10 See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
11 See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1939)
(discussing the full faith and credit obligation of one state to give effect to the laws of another in
terms of the interests of the respective states); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n,
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (same); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1930) (imposing due
process limitations on a choice of law that would impose unfair surprise upon a litigant).
12 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
14 See Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—
A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834-42 & accompanying notes (1927)
(laying out the series of statutory reforms by which the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the federal
courts were updated).
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federal courts that remain important resources to this day.15 Their work
helped to lay the foundation for the understanding that the Court soon
embraced in Guaranty Trust v. York that its Erie decision had articulated “a
policy of federal jurisdiction,” as Justice Frankfurter would put it when given
the opportunity to translate his scholarly work into an opinion for the
Court.16
That understanding of the Erie doctrine was bound up with a newly
emerging account of the scope, content and function of federal common law.
Following Erie, the Court had to reconsider the proper role of federal courts
in crafting federal policy in the absence of express congressional direction. In
the process, it had to determine what parts of its Swift-era jurisprudence
would survive in the new order. Contemporaneous with that judicial inquiry,
during the 1940s, Professors Hart and Wechsler undertook the monumental
scholarly project that would culminate in the 1953 first edition of The Federal
Courts and the Federal System,17 the casebook that defined Federal Courts as a
coherent field of study distinct from Civil Procedure and worthy of separate
attention and facilitated more expansive and sophisticated analysis of the
distinctive purpose and function of the federal courts and federal jurisdiction.
From this roiling sea emerged the Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon. Short,
simple, and containing little analysis, Klaxon held that a federal court hearing
a case in its diversity jurisdiction was required to apply the same choice-oflaw rules that would have governed the case had it been brought in a court of
the state in which it sits. Klaxon swept away over a hundred years of practice
in which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had issued independent
choice-of-law rulings in common law cases. Like so much in the post-Erie
years, Klaxon was a revolution. And, like so much in those years, it was merely
an initial statement in a complex field that would require further elaboration.
The Sections that follow begin that overdue exposition.
B. The Changes that Erie Wrought
The revolution that Erie brought about in the American legal system
operated on multiple levels. Most conspicuously, the decision “overruled a
particular way of looking at law,” as Justice Frankfurter put it, under which
“federal courts [had] deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and
therefore Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State
15 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483
(1928); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
H ARV . L. R EV . 49 (1923).
16 Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
17 H ENRY M. H ART & H ERBERT W ECHSLER , T HE F EDERAL C OURTS AND TH E
F EDERAL S YSTEM (1953).
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law,” even in cases where Congress was without power to frame federal rules
of decision.18 In rejecting that view, the Court gave voice to principles of
federalism and separation of powers that had a constitutional dimension.
Soon thereafter, the Court defined the “policy of federal jurisdiction”19—“the
twin aims of the Erie rule,”20 as the Court would later put it—that has served
as the starting point for determining the applicable law in “procedural”
disputes in federal diversity courts where judge-made law is the potential
source of the federal rule. These matters are well known—they constitute the
received wisdom of the Erie ruling.
But Erie also had a dramatic institutional impact. The ruling transformed
the business of the Supreme Court, altering the range of issues that it would
have occasion to decide, the supervisory function that it would serve in
relation to the lower federal courts, and the certiorari policy that it would
follow under the new dispensation. It also required the Court to develop a
new vocabulary for describing the proper role of the federal courts in
promulgating rules of decision in the absence of express congressional
direction. When the Court pronounced that “[t]here is no federal general
common law,”21 it set itself the task of determining which of its Swift-era
precedents would survive that pronouncement.
A close analysis of the cases decided in the decade following Erie finds the
Court adopting a conservative approach as it takes the full measure of its
paradigm-shifting decision along all these dimensions. The Court acted
quickly to realign its institutional relationship with the lower federal courts,
updating its policies on certiorari and standards of review to reflect the new
reality and, where necessary, exercising a heavy hand of supervision to adapt
the lower federal courts to their new task. But the realignment of the
doctrines of federal common law came more gradually. The Court permitted
itself to be vague about the governing source of law in several early cases in
which it was not yet ready to resolve questions of federal power but
apparently believed that circumstances required it to grant certiorari and
issue a federal answer. And when the Court did provide guidance about the
power of the federal courts to issue controlling rules of decision in the absence
of express federal authority, it did so slowly and in stages—reaffirming those
lines of precedent that survived from the Swift era, preserving others under
a federal common-law rubric, and speaking in a new way about the role of
federal courts in resolving disputes involving competing assertions of state
authority.
18
19
20
21

Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 101-02.
Id. at 101.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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The formalistic language of the Klaxon decision reflects little of this
unfolding terrain. That fact in itself is revealing. When one understands more
fully the set of doctrinal developments in which Klaxon was embedded and
how those developments were being discussed in contemporaneous decisions,
the sparseness of the opinion suggests the limited scope of the issues that the
Court resolved. When combined with the questions of choice of law and
jurisdictional policy that remained open in cases following Klaxon—either
reserved expressly by the Court or explored in dictum—a picture emerges of
a more dynamic field of play than has previously been acknowledged for
choice of law in federal courts.
1. Institutional and Analytical Transitions
Following the Ruling in Erie
Erie required the Court to address some immediate transitional issues.
Cases already in progress before the lower federal courts that had begun under
the rule of Swift had to be reconsidered. The Supreme Court’s own policies on
granting certiorari and handling appeals had to be restructured. And there were
threshold questions about how broadly the ruling in Erie would be applied and
how federal courts would go about determining the content of state law. The
Court took up many of these questions in the three years between Erie and
Klaxon. At the same time, the Court itself had to learn a new analytical mode
and a greater degree of precision in specifying the source of the common law
principles that it was applying in commercial disputes, a precision that was
surprisingly slow in coming in those transitional years.
One week after Erie, the Court handed down its opinion in
Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance,22 a state-law dispute involving a request for
rescission of several life insurance policies. Largely forgotten now, Ruhlin was
one of the standard citations in the Court’s Erie jurisprudence for a number
of years, for it was the case in which the Court first held that the rejection of
the general federal common law applied in equity cases as well as actions at
law.23 The Rules of Decision Act (RDA) applied only to “trials at common
Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
Id. at 205. Earlier decisions had also looked to state supreme court opinions on matters of
contract interpretation, but as a matter of prudence rather than “power.” Ruhlin superseded those
decisions and held that:
22
23

The decision in [Erie] goes further, and settles the question of power. The
subject is now to be governed, even in the absence of state statute, by the
decisions of the appropriate state court. The doctrine applies though the
question of construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in
equity.
Id.
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law” until it was amended in 1948 to encompass all “civil actions,”24 but the
Court offered no analysis for its conclusion that Erie controlled in such cases
as well, perhaps taking it to be a self-evident result of the constitutional
component of the ruling or perhaps desiring to avoid broad pronouncements
or dense analysis at such an early point in the journey upon which it had
embarked. That reticence was apparent in another aspect of the ruling as well:
the dispute in Ruhlin presented a potential choice-of-law issue, but the Court
expressly declined to decide it, a reservation that the Klaxon Court would
make reference to three years later.25
The Ruhlin decision also explained the change in the Court’s certiorari
policy that the rejection of Swift occasioned, reflecting Erie’s immediate
institutional consequences for the business of the Court.
Had [Erie] been announced at some prior date the course of this case might
have been different. This court might not have issued a writ of certiorari.
Rule 38(5) of the Supreme Court Rules . . . indicates that this Court will
consider, as a reason for granting a writ of certiorari, the fact that “a Circuit
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another Circuit Court of Appeals on the same matter . . . .” As to questions
controlled by state law, however, conflict among circuits is not of itself a
reason for granting a writ of certiorari. The conflict may be merely corollary
to a permissible difference of opinion in the state courts.26

It would take the Court several years to sort out the role it would play in
reviewing decisions of lower federal courts on pure questions of state law, as
I discuss below.
In the two weeks after Ruhlin, the Court issued four GVR orders granting
pending requests for certiorari on federal judgments that had been issued
under the general common law of Swift, vacating the rulings and remanding
24 See Act of Jun. 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 944 (1948), which amended the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012), to substitute “civil actions” for “trials at common law” in
describing the ambit of the statute. The change brought the language of the RDA into alignment
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which merged law and equity and specified the “civil
action” as the unit of civil litigation in the federal courts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form
of action—the civil action.”).
25 See Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 208 n.2 (“Under the general doctrine the interpretation of an
insurance contract depends on the law of the place where the policy is delivered. We do not now
determine which principle must be enforced if the Pennsylvania courts follow a different conflict of
laws rule.” (citation omitted)); Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 494 (“The principal question in this case is
whether in diversity cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states
in which they sit. We left this open in [Ruhlin].”).
26 Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 205-06. Professor Hartnett notes the impact of Erie in his discussion of
the Court’s discretionary certiorari practice following enactment of the Judges’ Bill of 1925.
See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1721 n.443 (2000).
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for further consideration in light of Erie and Ruhlin.27 Those orders signaled
to the lower federal courts that they should take it upon themselves to alter
course in their pending cases, entertaining petitions for rehearing where
necessary in light of the potential change in the governing rule of decision
that Erie brought. Despite the magnitude of that change, this part of the
transitional period appears to have been free of major crises, at least so far as
the Court’s own caseload reveals. There are only a few cases during this time
in which it appears that the Court had to employ its writ of certiorari to
discipline resistant circuit courts.28
A cluster of questions predictably arose early in the Court’s Erie cases
involving the content of state law: the analytical question of how to determine
that content, and the institutional question of how the Supreme Court would
treat such determinations by lower federal courts. As to the first, the Court
quickly held that, in the absence of controlling decisions by state supreme
courts, the federal courts were bound to follow the decisions of intermediate
state appellate courts.29 That ruling committed the Court to the proposition
that state law principles have determinate content even in the absence of a
27 See N.Y. Life Ins. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261, 262 (1938) (GVR order in action to cancel
insurance policy on grounds of fraud); Rosenthal v. N.Y. Life Ins., 304 U.S. 263, 264 (1938) (same);
Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397, 397-98 (1938) (GVR order in negligence action for personal
injuries); Mut. Benefit, Health & Accident Ass’n v. Bowman, 304 U.S. 549, 550 (1938) (GVR
order for unspecified dispute).
28 The most conspicuous example involved a case in the Fifth Circuit, where the Supreme
Court began its opinion reversing that court by explaining, “We granted certiorari in this case to
review a judgment in which the Circuit Court of Appeals applied a Mississippi statute of limitations
contrary to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of the same statute to the same plea in the
same case.” Moore v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 631 (1941) (citations omitted), overruled on other
grounds, Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). Moore happens to have been
the Erie ruling that most closely preceded the Court’s decision in Klaxon.
Another pointed example, also from the Fifth Circuit, came in the earlier case of
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls. 306 U.S. 103 (1939). The Supreme
Court reversed an attempt by the Court of Appeals in Wichita Royalty to depart from a Texas
Supreme Court precedent that the Circuit had already rejected on general commercial law
principles at an earlier (pre-Erie) stage of the case. Following Erie, the Fifth Circuit stuck to
its guns, claiming that an intervening Texas Supreme Court decision had validated its position,
but the Supreme Court was having none of it. See id. at 109 (“Even if we thought this
distinction [upon which the Texas courts had relied] not well taken, nothing requires the state
courts to adopt the rule which the federal or other courts may believe to be the better one.
That the distinction [in the Texas case] was advisedly made and was not intended to modify
the rule announced by the state court on the appeal in this case, appears from the opinions in
both cases.”).
29 The Court issued three rulings to this effect on the same day, the leading one of which
was Fidelity Union Trust v. Field. 311 U.S. 169 (1940); see also West v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 311 U.S.
223, 236-37 (1940) (applying the same ruling to a case in involving two successive suits between
the same parties); Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13 of Cal., 311 U.S. 180, 188
(1940) (“We have fully discussed the principle involved in the cases of [West] and [Fidelity
Union Trust], decided this day, and further amplification is unnecessary.”).
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controlling decision by the highest state court, rejecting the assumption of
several circuits that they remained free to interpret that content for
themselves until the state supreme court weighed in.30 The Court also held
that lower federal courts were bound by authoritative state court rulings even
when those rulings were issued after judgment had been entered in a federal
district court and the case was on appeal—a ruling that rejected Swift-era
precedents that had relied on the vocabulary of vested rights in favor of a
more positivist account of the effect that changes in the law have on a pending
judicial proceeding.31
The Court’s conclusions about its own role in determining the content of
state law were less straightforward. Erie abruptly ended the Court’s status as
the final expositor of general common law principles for the federal courts,
and the Court vacillated for a few years in defining its new supervisory
function. In several cases, the Court rejected circuit court rulings on the
content of state law without reciting any obligation to give deference to those
rulings, though it is clear that the Court believed the interpretations it was
rejecting in those cases were strained.32 In others, the Court expressed
reluctance to revisit the decisions of lower federal courts on questions of state
law, though it did not specify how that reluctance would be given formal
expression.33 By 1943, the Court appeared to have settled on a formal plain
error standard, pronouncing in Palmer v. Hoffman that “[w]here the lower
federal courts are applying local law, we will not set aside their ruling except
on a plain showing of error.”34 But that pronouncement was short-lived.
Palmer was not cited for this proposition in any subsequent Erie case and
appears to have been relied on by the Court on only one occasion for this

30

As the Court explained in Fidelity Union Trust:
The highest state court is the final authority on state law, but it is still the duty of the
federal courts, where the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain and apply
that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court of the State. An
intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is acting as an organ
of the State and its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence of what
the state law is, should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question . . .
whether the question is one of statute or common law.

311 U.S. at 177-78 (citations omitted).
31 Vanderbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540-42 (1941).
32 See, e.g., Wichita Royalty, 306 U.S. at 109-10 (rejecting Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of
intervening changes in Texas law).
33 See, e.g., Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1940) (“The Circuit Court of Appeals
held that under New York law the terms of the trust would not be changed ‘unless the wife can
disaffirm it for fraud, overreaching, or the like.’ If the case was here on application of local law under
the rule of [Erie], we would not be inclined to disturb that finding.” (citation omitted)).
34 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943).
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issue, in an unusual context and decades later.35 Following Palmer, the Court
would spend several years expressing its reluctance to disturb the rulings of
lower federal courts on matters of state law in terms of its certiorari policy36
before eventually returning to a principle of deference to the lower federal
courts, albeit in vaguer terms than the Court had first used in Palmer,37
coupled with a de facto certiorari policy under which it is now exceedingly rare for
the Court to review diversity rulings solely in order to correct errors in state law.
During this same period, the Court’s own statements on the sources and
content of the law it was applying were surprisingly non-specific in several
key decisions. In the first case in which it acknowledged Erie in the term
following the decision, the Court weighed in on a high-stakes trademark
dispute between two manufacturers of breakfast cereal, Kellogg and Nabisco,
over their competing shredded wheat products.38 In a footnote at the outset
of the majority opinion, Justice Brandeis observed:
The federal jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship—National Biscuit
Company being a New Jersey corporation and Kellogg Company a Delaware
corporation. Most of the issues in the case involve questions of common law
and hence are within the scope of [Erie]. But no claim has been made that the
local law is any different from the general law on the subject, and both parties
have relied almost entirely on federal precedent.39

35 The lone reference appears in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in a
portion of the opinion analyzing and upholding parts of a Pennsylvania law that restricted access to
abortion procedures. 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992).
36 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1944) (per curiam) (“The decision of
the highest court of a state on matters of state law are in general conclusive upon us, and ordinarily
we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional cases, the considered determination of
questions of state law by the intermediate federal appellate courts…”).
37 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (“Following our normal practice, ‘we
defer to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts . . . to reflect our belief
that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws
of their respective States.’” (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 499-500
(1985))). This deference is at its strongest when the lower federal courts agree on the construction
of state law. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988) (“This Court rarely
reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal courts.”).
It should be noted that such deference to lower federal court pronouncements on state law
exhibits a degree of tension with the Court’s 1991 ruling that federal appeals courts should review
the rulings of district courts de novo on issues of state law, owing in part to the superior institutional
capacity of appeals courts to consider difficult questions of law (and to some skepticism about the
“local expertise” rationale for deference). See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-39
(1991). It is perhaps in part for this reason that the Court has chosen to be vague in the nature of
the deference that it shows, reserving to itself the prerogative to reject lower court interpretations
of state law whenever it deems it appropriate to do so.
38 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
39 Id. at 113 n.1.
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This is a remarkable finesse for the Court (and the jurist) that had just
turned the world of common-law adjudication in the federal courts upsidedown. When the Court went on to define the duties that fall on bearers of
potentially confusing trademarks—for example when it explained that “[t]he
obligation resting upon Kellogg Company is not to insure that every
purchaser will know it to be the maker [when consumers eat its shredded
wheat] but to use every reasonable means to prevent confusion”—it
demonstrated no concern for specifying the source of the law that it was
making.40 Five years before its decision in Clearfield Trust,41 the Court was
apparently not yet ready to identify its role in defining rights peripheral to a
federal issue (in Kellogg, the federal trademark registration provisions),42
leaving doubt as to which tribunals should consider themselves bound by the
principles the Court was articulating. Indeed, in the years immediately
following Kellogg, some lower federal courts sitting in diversity took the
Court’s equivocation on the matter as an invitation to use Kellogg as something
like a general federal common law precedent.43 Kellogg continues as a point of
reference in jurisprudence under the Lanham Act44—subsequently enacted in
194645—which now defines the rights and duties associated with trademark

40 Id. at 121. In another representative passage, the Court speaks to the rights of manufacturers
to enjoy the benefits of goodwill generated by their competitors.

Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known as
“Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill and
judgment of plaintiff ’s predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures
in advertising presently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all—
and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.
Id. at 122.
41 Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
42 See Kellogg, 311 U.S. at 117 n.3 (“The trade-marks are registered under the [federal] Act of
1920. But it is well settled that registration under it has no effect on the domestic common-law rights
of the person whose trade-mark is registered.”) (citations omitted).
43 See, e.g., Skinner Mfg. v. Gen. Foods Sales, 52 F. Supp. 432, 438-40 (D. Neb. 1943)
(describing the difficulties of ascertaining Nebraska law on a trademark issue and the “absurdities”
produced by attempting a choice-of-law analysis and relying upon Kellogg to conclude that “there is
no disposition in this state to depart from the generally prevailing rule”).
44 The case is cited in disputes under the Act involving advertising and trademark. See, e.g.,
Kenner Parker Toys v. Tyco Indus., No. 87 Civ. 1136(WK), 1987 WL 124319, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
20, 1987) (“Justice Brandeis’ opinion [in Kellogg] articulated the doctrines upon which the Lanham
Act was based, and continues to be cited for the proposition it formulated.”).
45 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012)).
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infringement as a matter of federal law.46 At the time it was issued, however,
the decision left unspecified the source of law that it was applying.
In another dispute, United States v. Bethlehem Steel,47 decided four years
later (and still a year before Clearfield Trust), the Court again declined to state
the sources of law on which it was relying in resolving a major commercial
lawsuit, this one between the United States and a shipbuilding company
relating to manufacturing services that the company rendered during World
War I. The dispute sounded in contract, with the government claiming that
Bethlehem had exercised duress and acted in bad faith during a time of
exigent need and hence should be denied a portion of the profits for which it
had bargained. In ruling against the government, the lower federal courts had
applied state law, as they believed Erie required.48 Once again, the Court
recognized that there was some question as to what law should govern a case
involving rights peripheral to a federal issue (here, contracting with the U.S.
government), and once again it declined to decide the issue. Pronouncing
broadly on such core contract principles as consideration, unconscionability
and duress, the Court claimed that it “need not decide” the source of law in
the case because it thought the governing principles to be so well
established.49 Those principles were not so clear to Justice Frankfurter, who
dissented on the merits, but even Frankfurter shared in this remarkable lack
of attention to the sources of the controlling law.50 Indeed, in the lower-court
opinion in Clearfield Trust that the Supreme Court later affirmed, the Third
Circuit indicated that the Court had “avoided” this important question in
Bethlehem Steel.51 Bethlehem Steel, too, was cited for several decades, as a sort
of general-law precedent for contract disputes.52

46 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (citing Kellogg in
discussion of the “functionality doctrine,” which “prevents trademark law . . . from . . . inhibiting
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.”).
47 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
48 Id. at 299 n.9.
49 Id. at 299-300; see also id. at 299 (“[W]e know of no federal or state statute or established
rule of law in any jurisdiction inconsistent with the elementary proposition that a promise to build
ships is good consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money whether fixed in amount or
depending upon the relationship between actual and estimated cost.”).
50 See, e.g., id. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But is there any principle which is more
familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that
the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequality and injustice?”); id. at
326-31 (variously citing to Swift-era cases, state-law cases, and cases suggesting a federal commonlaw rule of decision in discussing the concept of duress).
51 United States v. Clearfield Tr., 130 F.2d 93, 95 n.6 (3d Cir. 1942), aff ’d, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
52 See, e.g., In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 727 n.9 (5th Cir. 1971) (in contract issue
governed by Mississippi law, citing Bethlehem Steel along with Corbin on Contracts and various
Mississippi authorities on the issue of consideration).
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The failure of the Court to specify the exact source of the rule of decision
in its cases, even on important issues, is not a failing unique to this
transitional period. To note just one conspicuous and more recent example,
the Court took sixty-three years following its ruling in Erie to explain the
source and content of the preclusive effect that attaches to a judgment issued
by a federal court sitting in diversity.53 Nonetheless, these two instances are
telling. In both cases, the Court may have felt that institutional concerns
impelled it to grant a writ of certiorari and resolve the disputes:
Kellogg v. Nabisco raised questions about trademark, competition and product
development that were pressing enough to lead Congress to enact national
standards within a few years of the Court’s decision, and Bethlehem Steel
involved a major wartime contract dispute with the United States as the
complaining party. At the same time, it is apparent that the Court was not
yet ready to write broadly about the role that preemptive federal common law
would play in cases where federal issues were closely mingled with rights
traditionally defined by common-law doctrine. And so the Court spoke
broadly about trademark infringement and the contractual rights and
obligations of the U.S. government without requiring of itself the same
discipline that it was demanding of lower federal courts in speaking carefully
about sources of law.
2. Federal Common Law
Despite the ambiguity of decisions like Kellogg and Bethlehem Steel, the
Court did begin to provide guidance on the status and content of federal
common law—a term that encompasses a broader array of issues than is
commonly appreciated. Contemporary discussions of federal common law
focus the bulk of their attention on the limited class of cases involving federal
liability or regulatory rules that displace contrary state law in both state and
federal proceedings and are developed by courts to give voice to “uniquely
federal interests”54 or as extensions or interstitial interpretations of federal
statutes. The Court itself sometimes uses the term “federal common law”
coextensively with this subset of cases.55 It is an impoverished vocabulary that
threatens to obscure the full range of issues that the Court was forced to
rethink upon issuing the Erie decision. The judicially crafted doctrines that
53 See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (holding that the
preclusive effect of a judgment issued by a federal diversity court is governed by federal common
law but that the applicable state preclusion law should ordinarily be incorporated by reference
barring some strong federal interest calling for a different or distinctly federal rule).
54 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
55 Id. (referring to such preemptive, judicially crafted federal rules of decision as “so-called
‘federal common law’”).
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govern the internal administration of remedies and procedure in the federal
courts—equity practice, for example, or forum non conveniens—are also the
product of federal common law, as are doctrines that provide for the
resolution of competing claims of authority between states.56 Disputes
presenting all three types of problem were a vibrant part of the Court’s docket
in the decade following Erie, the latter two even more so than the type of
preemptive liability and regulatory rules that the Court authorized in
Clearfield Trust (and failed to address in Bethlehem Steel).
The Court cautiously approached the task of sorting through this cluster
of issues during the early years after Klaxon, as seen in
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,57 in which the Court again ducked the
federal common law question that it had avoided in Bethlehem Steel along with
a host of related questions concerning choice of law and jurisdictional policy
in the federal courts. The case involved a bank note that the FDIC sought to
enforce in the face of a defense that the note, as originally issued, was never
meant to be called for payment. Decision of the case seemingly required the
Court to specify the source of law that would govern that putative defense,
which in turn implicated arguments about federal common law and choice of
law in a non-diversity case (because both Missouri and Illinois law were
potentially applicable, if state law controlled). The Court was unanimous in
rejecting the defense, but only Justice Jackson was prepared to be explicit in
specifying the analytical underpinnings of that result, chastising his
colleagues for their failure to do so.
I think we should attempt a more explicit answer to the question whether
federal or state law governs our decision in this sort of case than is found
either in the opinion of the Court or in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
FRANKFURTER. That question, as old as the federal judiciary, is met
inescapably at the threshold of this case. It is the one which moved us to grant
certiorari, and we could not resort to the rule announced without at least a
tacit answer to it.58

56 Federal common law can also operate to carry into effect the procedural policies embodied
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their appellate counterparts through procedural field
preemption, even when the text of such provisions do not expressly prescribe that result—a mode
of analysis that has been underappreciated and imperfectly rendered in the case law and scholarship
in this area. Properly understood, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987), in which the Court concluded that a federal diversity court should follow
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 37 and 38 rather than contrary state law when determining
what penalties should accompany an unsuccessful appeal, falls into this category. See Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 17, 25-52 (2010).
57 D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
58 Id. at 465 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The Court would wait another year before providing guidance on
preemptive federal common law doctrine in Clearfield Trust, and its
statements on choice of law and jurisdictional policy would come more
sporadically.
This subsection will sketch the landscape of federal common law during
this transitional period in three stages. It begins with brief accounts of the
emergence of federal common law rulings in the internal administration of
the federal courts and in the articulation of preemptive liability and
regulatory rules. It then examines the array of cases in which the Court
discussed the role of the federal courts in framing rules of decision in cases
involving competing or overlapping claims of state authority, including a
surprisingly rich discussion of the issue in cases like D’Oench, Duhme in which
choice-of-laws problems arose in a non-diversity context. Although the
Supreme Court never issued a ruling expressly carving such cases out of the
ambit of the Klaxon doctrine, it indicated its appreciation of the distinct
doctrinal and jurisprudential forces that might properly govern such a
dispute.
a. Internal Administration of Federal Court Proceedings
The power of federal courts to develop judge-made law for the internal
administration of federal court proceedings, and the circumstances in which
those rules of decision must bow to contrary state practice, has become largely
synonymous with the “Erie doctrine” in modern parlance. The issue was
addressed relatively late in the transitional period following Erie and, to an
extent usually forgotten in contemporary discussions, was enmeshed with
other questions of federal power that the Court was still sorting through. The
decision in which the Court first spoke meaningfully to the issue, the 1945
ruling in Guaranty Trust v. York,59 is often reduced to a tag line—the “outcome
determination” test—and understood in light of the over-simplified account
that the Court gave of the case in Hanna v. Plumer.60 In fact, the decision is
both nuanced and deft. Justice Frankfurter navigated the Court through a
cluster of problems in Guaranty Trust that had been producing confusion and
conflicting rulings for the seven years that preceded it.
Guaranty Trust involved a representative proceeding, brought in equity
under New York law, asserting a breach of fiduciary duty by the defendant
financial institution in its dealings with the holders of certain notes. The issue
on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari concerned the timeliness of
the suit. The defendant claimed that the suit was barred under the New York
59
60

Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
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statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that a
federal court sitting in equity was authorized to apply its own doctrine of
laches to permit a suit that would be untimely under the statute so long as the
defendant would suffer no prejudice from the delay. The Court held that the
state statute of limitations was controlling.
Prior to the Court’s ruling, the proper treatment of equitable remedies in
a post-Erie federal proceeding was an unsettled matter. As noted above, the
Court had proclaimed just a few weeks after Erie that its rejection of the
general common law applied with equal force in cases brought in equity,
despite the language still present in the Rules of Decision Act at that time
that limited the statute to trials at common law.61 It was clear that federal
equity courts sitting in diversity had to look to state decisional law for
controlling liability rules. Two years later, however, the Court rejected the
application of a state statute of limitations in a federal question case, using
language that seemed to preserve a broad role for federal equity powers. The
case, Russell v. Todd,62 involved an equitable class proceeding brought under
the Federal Farm Loan Act that sought distribution of an insolvent fund
among shareholders. The federal statute had no statute of limitations
provision, requiring the Court to decide what standard should control
questions of timeliness. The defendants claimed the action was barred by the
statute of limitations of the state where suit was brought. The Court rejected
that argument, instead applying a federal laches standard to find the claim
timely. In describing the scope of a federal court’s remedial equitable powers,
the Court emphasized that “[t]he Rules of Decision Act does not apply to
suits in equity”—a seeming retrenchment from its broad pronouncement in
Ruhlin on questions of equitable remedies—and so “the question decisive of
this case is what lapse of time will bar recovery in the absence of an applicable
federal statute of limitations.”63 The Court then looked to Swift-era
precedents for a federal answer. It noted the continuing vitality of a line of
cases under which federal equity courts had sometimes incorporated state
statutes of limitations by reference for certain types of equitable disputes but
concluded that those cases were not applicable and instead applied an
independent laches standard. Acknowledging Erie at the close of its analysis,
the Russell Court said that it had “no occasion to consider the extent to which
federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon them by
Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow state statutes
and decisions affecting those remedies.”64 The pair of cases led Justice Jackson
61
62
63
64

See Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205-06 (1938).
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 294.
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to note two years later that the effect of Erie on disputes falling outside
ordinary diversity jurisdiction “seems not to have been definitely settled,”65
and Justice Frankfurter began his 1945 opinion by noting the issue that Russell
had left open.66
In Guaranty Trust, the Court had to disaggregate the questions of equity
practice, jurisdiction and federal power that it had finessed in Russell. Because
the Conformity Act and its predecessor did not apply to suits in equity, the
federal courts had been developing their own “forms and modes of
proceeding”67 in equity suits, including remedial doctrines, throughout their
institutional history.68 At the same time, the distinction between concepts of
“remedy” and “liability rule” was not always carefully policed in equity
practice, particularly under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, where the federal
courts were often free to craft equitable remedies and define rights and
obligations without distinguishing carefully between the two.69 When
Russell v. Todd strongly reaffirmed the power of federal courts to craft
equitable remedies without regard to the Rules of Decision Act, it created
uncertainty about the freedom that federal diversity courts might also retain to rely
on quasi-substantive equitable doctrines to displace state rules of decision.
In a portion of his opinion in Guaranty Trust that is often forgotten in
contemporary discussions, Justice Frankfurter clarified the status of federal
equity practice following Erie:

D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 467 n.3 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 100 (1945).
Conformity Act of 1872, §5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
The power to craft equitable doctrines and remedies traces back to the second Congress,
which enacted legislation authorizing the federal courts to employ traditional equitable doctrines
and craft such new doctrines (either by decision or through rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court) as they deemed expedient. Here is the relevant text:
65
66
67
68

And be it further enacted, That the forms of writs, executions and other process . . . shall
be the same as are now used in . . . [courts] of equity and in those of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to
courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively . . . .
An Act for Regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations
for the Officers of the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792)
(emphasis in original).
69 As Justice Frankfurter notes, however,
it may fairly be said that the federal courts gave greater respect to State-created
‘substantive rights’ in equity than they gave them on the law side, because rights at
law were usually declared by State courts and as such increasingly flouted by extension
of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, while rights in equity were frequently defined by
legislative enactment and as such known and respected by the federal courts.
Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted).
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From the beginning, there has been a good deal of talk in the cases that federal
equity is a separate legal system. And so it is, properly understood. The suits
in equity of which the federal courts have had cognizance ever since 1789
constituted the body of law which had been transplanted to this country from
the English Court of Chancery. But this system of equity derived its doctrines,
as well as its powers, from its mode of giving relief. In giving federal courts
cognizance of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never
gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.70

To be fully descriptively accurate, Frankfurter might have written, “nor
did the federal courts ever properly claim” such a power, since many federal
courts (including the Second Circuit in Guaranty Trust itself) often made
broad assumptions about the substantive prerogatives that equity afforded
them. Nonetheless, with this passage and the analysis that surrounded it, the
Court confirmed the continuing ability of federal diversity courts to develop
and apply equitable doctrines in diversity cases so long as they gave effect to
the parties’ rights and obligations as defined by state law.71
In the better-known portions of his opinion, Justice Frankfurter then
explained that the relevant line between “right” and “remedy” would be
defined with reference to the jurisdictional policy that the Court had
embraced for diversity cases in Erie. “Equitable relief in a federal court is of
course subject to restrictions,” Frankfurter wrote, and the fact that “a State
may authorize its courts to give equitable relief unhampered by any or all such
restrictions cannot remove these fetters from the federal courts.”72 Rather, it
is those differences in remedial practice that would “substantially affect the
enforcement of the right as given by the State” that call for the application of
state law, because “[t]he nub of the policy that underlies [Erie] is that for the
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in federal

Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Court’s desire to maintain the consistency and stability of its equity precedents can be
seen in the closing passage of the majority opinion:
70
71

Dicta may be cited characterizing equity as an independent body of law. To the extent
that we have indicated, it is. But insofar as these general observations go beyond that,
they merely reflect notions that have been replaced by a sharper analysis of what
federal courts do when they enforce rights that have no federal origin. And so, before
the true source of law that is applied by the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction
was fully explored, some things were said that would not now be said. But nothing
that was decided . . . needs to be rejected.
Id. at 112.
72 Id. at 105-06.
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court instead of in a state court a block away, should not lead to a substantially
different result.”73
Nothing like this analysis had appeared in the Court’s cases in such a fully
realized form in the seven years leading up to Guaranty Trust. In several
rulings (including Klaxon, as I discuss below), the Court had defined certain
doctrines as “substantive” by way of holding that they fell within the ambit
of Erie.74 In another case, the Court indicated (without further analysis) that
state law must control “as to both substantive and procedural rights of the
parties . . . where, as in this case, it controls decision.”75 And in two cases,
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and Palmer v. Hoffman, the Court had begun to define
the capacity of the newly authorized Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
displace contrary state law—expansively and with wooden formalism in
Sibbach;76 with more nuance and moderation in Hoffman.77 But Guaranty Trust
was the first occasion on which the Court provided an analytical framework
that would support the promulgation of judicially crafted doctrines for the
internal administration of federal court proceedings while also identifying
those circumstances when the Erie doctrine might require such federal
doctrines to bow to state law.
Given the significance of that innovation, it is perhaps not surprising that
the Court was slow to provide further refinement. Soon after Guaranty Trust,
the Court issued a pair of rulings, both involving cases filed in New York, in
which it translated another judicially crafted doctrine for the administration
of federal proceedings past the Swift–Erie divide: forum non conveniens.78 The
second ruling, Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, has proven durable and remains a standard
point of reference in federal forum non cases.79 The Court’s ruling in
Id. at 108-09.
See, e.g., Cities Servs. Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (“We cannot accept the view
that the [burden of proof in action for ownership of land] was only one of practice in courts of
equity. Rather we think it relates to a substantial right upon which the holder of recorded legal title
to Texas land may confidently rely.”).
75 See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236 (1944) (per curiam) (requiring adherence to
state law in determining whether a mandatory tax levy may be imposed to satisfy defaulted bonds).
76 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really
regulates procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”).
77 See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (“Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of
pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local
law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.”) (citations omitted).
78 See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947) (holding that “the District Court did not
exceed its powers or the bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff ’s complaint and remitting
him to the courts of his own community.”); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 55960 (1946) (holding that “it was improper to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens”).
79 With the enactment of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012), the federal
forum non doctrine has come to apply almost exclusively in international cases where the alternative
forum would be a non-U.S. court; inconvenient domestic cases are handled through venue transfer.
73
74
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Guaranty Trust helped confirm the power to develop an independent federal
standard for forum non. But the Court ducked the Erie question in both cases,
declining to decide whether the jurisdictional policy of federal diversity
might require application of state forum non standards in some instances (a
question that the Supreme Court has still not addressed). In the earlier ruling,
Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., the Court noted a Second Circuit decision
holding that Erie required federal diversity courts “to apply the local rule of
forum non conveniens,” but it “reserve[d] decision on that question” because,
it said, New York forum non doctrine would produce the same result in that
case.80 The following year, Gulf Oil found the lower courts still struggling with
these questions, with the district court holding that local law controlled the
forum non analysis and the Second Circuit rejecting that argument and
applying a federal standard that adopted a restrictive reading of Williams and
a narrow rule.81 The Supreme Court used Gulf Oil to provide more guidance
on the content of the federal forum non standard, but it once again declined
to say what would happen if state and federal standards diverged, issuing a
caveat similar to the one in Williams.82
In short, it took seven years for the Court to settle on an approach to the
promulgation of federal common law doctrines geared toward the internal
administration of federal court proceedings (and applicable only in those
courts). Slowly and with uneven results, the Court separated out the elements
of Erie that sounded in federalism and the limits of federal power from those
that flowed from the jurisdictional policy of the general diversity statute.
Even thereafter, it applied this new approach with caution. Ten years out, the
Court was prepared to reaffirm the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a

Nonetheless, the Court continues to rely upon Gulf Oil. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 255-61 (1981) (embracing Gulf Oil and applying its treatment of public and private interest
factors to uphold a district court’s entry of dismissal in an international dispute).
80 Williams, 326 U.S. at 558-59.
81 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 503; Gilbert v. Gulf Oil, 153 F.2d 883, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1946), rev’d,
Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
82 As the Court stated in Gulf Oil:
The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and as to the standards that guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the
same as the federal rule. It would not be profitable, therefore, to pursue inquiry as to
the source from which our rule must flow.
330 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted).
It bears remarking, once again, the surprising analytical recklessness in this way of proceeding.
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s willingness to pronounce rules
of decision in major cases without specifying the source of law). If federal diversity courts were in
fact bound by local standards of forum non conveniens, then the Gulf Oil Court could simply have
vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to review, for abuse of
discretion, the district court’s assessment of the New York doctrine.
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matter of federal power, but unready to explain how the doctrine should be
measured against the jurisdictional policies that govern a diversity case.
b. Preemptive Liability and Regulatory Rules
The doctrine most commonly associated with the term “federal common
law”—judicially crafted liability and regulatory rules that uniformly displace
contrary state law, regardless of forum—developed unevenly in the
transitional years. As discussed above, the Court exhibited caution in
developing rules aimed at enforcing important federal interests, leading to
analytically unsatisfying decisions like Bethlehem Steel, before it embraced the
doctrine squarely in Clearfield Trust. At the same time, the Court was more
confident in promulgating interstitial rules in cases that were governed by a
federal statute but as to which “Congress ha[d] not specifically provided for
the present contingency,” leaving certain “details to judicial implication.”83
And the Court showed nuance in defining the relationship between federal
law and state standards. In a variety of contexts, the Court found that federal
law provided the rule of decision but would incorporate state law by reference
when federal interests did not demand an independent standard.
The Court’s quick reaffirmation of the power to develop interstitial
rules—rules of decision in cases governed by federal statute but involving
circumstances not specifically contemplated by the statutory text84—is not
surprising, as it is perhaps the least adventuresome type of preemptive federal
common law. Even so, Erie’s tectonic shift was great enough to leave even this
question in doubt before the Court weighed in. In Deitrick v. Greaney, the
Court heard an appeal involving a promissory note held by a national bank in
receivership. The enforceability of the note was uncertain under a federal
statute, the National Bank Act.85 The Court read the statute expansively “in
the light of its purposes and policy”86 to empower the bank’s receiver to secure
payment on the note. Counsel on both sides of the dispute had assumed that
Erie might require them to measure the legality of the note under state law
standards, since the matter was not explicitly dealt with under the Bank Act.
The Court rejected that assumption, explaining: “[t]he extent and nature of
the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the statute to
judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal
83 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939) (applying
federal common law as an extension of a treaty in order to permit an award of interest on wrongfully
collected taxes, an outcome that applicable state law would have prohibited).
84 The use of the term “interstitial” in this setting appears to have been coined by Justice
Holmes. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (“I recognize . . . that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially.”).
85 See Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 191-93 (1940).
86 Id. at 198.
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policy which it has adopted . . . .”87 The Court would go on to reiterate the
proper role of the federal courts in articulating interstitial federal common
law in several subsequent cases. One of its strongest statements comes in
Sola Electric v. Jefferson Electric,88 a dispute involving the ability of a patent
licensee to challenge a price-fixing clause that lay at the intersection of the
federal patent laws and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In explaining the federal
character of the question, the Court wrote:
It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set
at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules.
In such a case our decision is not controlled by [Erie]. There we followed state
law because it was the law to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine
of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal
relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having
its source in those statutes, rather than by local law. When a federal statute
condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences
of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are
nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from
the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted. To the federal statute
and policy, conflicting state law and policy must yield.89

Even as it confirmed the post-Erie power of the federal courts to develop
preemptive rules of federal common law, the Court also went out of its way
to inflect that power with the federalism principles to which Erie had given
voice. Consider Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States.90
Jackson County presented the question whether a Native American was
entitled to interest on taxes that a state had collected from her in violation of
a federal treaty. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter rejected the Kansas
law that would have forbidden such interest on taxes and found that a federal
rule of decision was necessary to give proper effect to the treaty. He went on
to hold, however, that such interest was equitable in nature—available only
when fairness demanded, not compensation as of right—and that an award of
interest was not warranted in this case.91 There was thus no need for the Court
to specify the interest rate that would apply. Nonetheless, the Court reached
87 Id. at 200-01 (citation omitted); see also id. at 200 (“A point much discussed in brief and
argument, upon the assumption that local law will guide our decision is whether, by Massachusetts
law, respondent is precluded from setting up the illegality of the transaction as a defense to his note.”
(citation omitted)).
88 Sola Elec. v. Jefferson Elec., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
89 Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
90 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
91 Id. at 349-50, 352-53.
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out to decide the issue, finding in an extended discussion that federal law
should adhere to state standards in such a case unless strong federal policies
required otherwise:
Having left the matter at large for judicial determination within the
framework of familiar remedies equitable in their nature, Congress has left
us free to take into account appropriate considerations of “public
convenience.” . . . With reference to other federal rights, the state law has
been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law
was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was not
deemed inconsistent with federal policy [citing Swift-era cases]. In the
absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state interests, we draw
upon a general principle that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to
have a privileged position over other aggrieved tax-payers in their relation
with the states or their political subdivisions.92

This was Justice Frankfurter’s first statement on the interplay between
federal and state policy following his appointment to the Court, and it
prefigured the approach that he would adopt in Guaranty Trust six years later.
Indeed, the Court’s decision the following year in Clearfield Trust operated in
dialogue with rulings like Jackson County. In articulating the need for a
uniform federal rule to govern transactions involving commercial paper
issued by the U.S. government, Clearfield Trust rejected the proposal to
“absorb” state law as a governing federal standard and looked to its own
Swift- era precedents for a distinctive ly federal standard.93
Still, the Court’s account of its role in promulgating preemptive federal
common law during this period often had a more formalistic quality. In the
1942 case of Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,94 one of the first “reverse-Erie”
rulings, the Court heard an appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
a case involving the federal Jones Act. The Pennsylvania court had applied
state law on a burden-of-proof question, which it viewed as a “procedural”
92
93

Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
As the Court explained:
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law. But
reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate federal rule are singularly
inappropriate here . . . . The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws
rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty . . . . The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. And while the
federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of [Swift],
represented general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to
protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for
fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions.

318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (citation omitted).
94 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
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matter, finding that the burden rested on the plaintiff to disprove the validity
of a release he had executed that would prevent recovery even though the
rules of federal admiralty practice would place the burden on the defendant
to sustain the release. The Supreme Court explained that “the obligation on
law courts . . . to enforce substantive rights arising from admiralty law”
generally included an obligation “to do so in a manner conforming to
admiralty practice” and found this requirement to be binding on state courts
as a matter of federal law.95 In asking whether the burden-of-proof issue came
under this principle, the Court began its analysis with a statement about the
capacity of rules of practice “substantially to alter the rights . . . established
in federal law,” a formulation that prefigured Guaranty Trust to a small extent,
but it then rested its holding on the formalistic substance–procedure
dichotomy that the Guaranty Trust Court would later reject.96
3. Competing or Overlapping Claims of Interested States
Some of the most intriguing early statements by the Court on federal
common law are to be found in cases that involved competing or overlapping
claims of interested states. About a half dozen of the Court’s cases fit this
description in the decade following Erie, though only one—Hinderlider—
spoke to the issue as part of its square holding.97
The dispute in Hinderlider involved competing claims between Colorado
and New Mexico over the flow of water from the La Plata River. The river
originates in Colorado, flows into New Mexico, and serves as an important
source of irrigation water for both states. In 1925, Congress gave its consent
to an interstate compact between the two states that provided a formula by
which the waters would be apportioned when supply ran short. Supply ran
short in 1928 and the Colorado official responsible for administering the
Compact diverted the river’s water away from the facilities owned by the
95
96

Id. at 243-44.
That formalism is captured in the closing paragraphs of the opinion:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that in solving problems of
procedural, as distinguished from substantive, law, the law court may apply its own
doctrine; and that the locus of burden of proof presents a procedural rather than a
substantive question.
Much of what we have said above concerning the necessity of preserving all of
the substantial admiralty rights in an action at law is incompatible with the conclusion
of the court below. The right of the petitioner to be free from the burden of proof
imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule inhered in his cause of action. Deeply rooted
in admiralty as that right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot
be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure.

Id. at 248-49.
97 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
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La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company so that it would be available
to New Mexico users downstream. The Ditch Company sued, claiming that
its rights to water from the river should be measured with reference to
Colorado law—specifically, with reference to an 1898 state court judgment
that had applied Colorado law and purported to establish the rights of all
claimants, awarding the Ditch Company a right to water access that the
Compact was now interrupting. The Ditch Company claimed that the
Compact was unconstitutional (and hence could be ignored), either because
such compacts could never bind private citizens or because this particular
Compact deprived the Ditch Company of its vested rights under the earlier
judgment without due process or proper compensation.98
Prior to Hinderlider, a long line of cases had established a doctrine of
“equitable apportionment” under which the claims of competing states to the
flow of a river had to be resolved with due regard to the interests of each. In
such cases, the Court had held, adventitious circumstances that might place
one state in a position of advantage—such as the greater power of the
upstream state to exercise physical dominion over the flow waters of the
river—could not be permitted to govern the outcome. “The river throughout
its course in both States is but a single stream wherein each State has an
interest which should be respected by the other.”99 The greater ability of one
state to exercise physical power over the water could not be decisive under
this doctrine, since “[b]oth States have real and substantial interests in the
River that must be reconciled as best they may.”100
A significant part of the Court’s holding in Hinderlider involved a
reaffirmation of this equitable apportionment doctrine in the new world of
Erie, which the Court handed down on the same day. The Court rejected the
Ditch Company’s argument about its vested rights in the judgment, even
though it was willing to assume that the company had acquired a cognizable
property right in the earlier state proceeding,101 explaining that the doctrine
of equitable apportionment superseded state law and hence that any rights
the company had acquired in conjunction with the 1898 decree were
necessarily subject to that doctrine.102 The Court then clarified the source of
law for equitable apportionment in a passage explaining the basis for its
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Colorado court. Equitable
apportionment, the Court said, “is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon
98 See id. at 95-99.
99 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922).
100 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931).
101 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 102.
102 See id. at 108-09 (“As Colorado possessed the right only

to an equitable share of the water
in the stream, the decree of January 12, 1898, in the Colorado water proceeding did not award to the
Ditch Company any right greater than the equitable share.”).
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which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive.”103 Although one could have deduced the federal common law
status of equitable apportionment from the fact that the Court had not
previously viewed itself as bound by state statutory enactments in the cases
it decided under Swift, the reason for reiterating that proposition on the day
that Erie was handed down is obvious.
Like many of the cases discussed in this subsection, Hinderlider was an
occasion for the Court to identify a line of precedent that would continue to
be good law following Erie. But the character of this case was distinctive. As
with disputes between states over territorial boundaries (to which the Court
drew an explicit parallel),104 the occasion for the development of federal
common law in Hinderlider was framed as a resolution of the competing
claims of interested states.
The Court has not yet identified circumstances under which the principle
that drove the result in Hinderlider would justify the promulgation of
independent choice-of-law rules for use in the federal courts. But it has
recognized the connection between the two doctrines and repeatedly left the
issue open. Most conspicuously, in D’Oench, Duhme, the Court tied the
holding of Klaxon to questions of jurisdictional policy. As discussed above,
D’Oench, Duhme involved a claim on a note held by an FDIC-insured bank.
The Court ultimately held that this question was governed by a rule of federal
common law, but the lower federal courts had assumed that state law
controlled, requiring them to resolve a choice-of-law question.105 The court
of appeals applied a “general law” of conflicts to find that, as between Illinois
and Missouri, the status of the note should be governed by Illinois law.106
Shortly after this ruling the Supreme Court decided Klaxon, and the potential
conflict with the circuit court’s treatment of the choice-of-law issue in
D’Oench, Duhme prompted the Court to grant certiorari in that case.107
Because the Court found that the status of the note must be governed by
a federal regulatory rule, it did not decide the choice-of-law question. In
103 Id. at 110. Interestingly, there was some doubt at the time as to whether the interpretation
of the interstate compact itself would have been governed by federal law. See id. at 110 n.12 (“The
decisions [of this Court] are not uniform as to whether the interpretation of an interstate compact
presents a federal question.” (citations omitted)).
104 See id. (“Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in interstate streams is not different
from those concerning boundaries. These have been recognized as presenting federal questions.”).
105 Jurisdiction came from the Federal Reserve Act, which conferred power on the FDIC to
“sue or be sued in any court of law or equity, State or Federal,” a provision that was treated as an
independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,
455 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 264(j)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 455 (“We granted the petition for certiorari . . . because of the asserted conflict
between the decision below and [Klaxon].” (citations omitted)).
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reserving that question, however, the Court tied its recent holding in Klaxon
to the policies underlying the generic diversity provision.
We held in [Klaxon] that a failure of a federal court in a diversity of
citizenship case to follow the forum’s conflict of laws rules “would do violence
to the principle of uniformity within a state” upon which [Erie] was based.
The jurisdiction of the District Court in this case, however, is not based on
diversity of citizenship. Respondent, a federal corporation, brings this suit
under [the Federal Reserve Act, quoted above]. Whether the rule of the Klaxon
case applies where federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship,
we need not decide. For we are of the view that the liability of petitioner on
the note involves decision of a federal not a state question . . . .108

In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter went a half step further,
drawing the connection between the choice-of-law question and the federal
role in resolving disputes between competing, interested states that the Court
had recognized in Hinderlider. Frankfurter was not convinced that it was
necessary to articulate a federal regulatory rule in the case, since he believed
that the result would be the same no matter the source of law.109 Expanding
upon that view, Frankfurter acknowledged the argument that Klaxon had no
application where the clash of state interests arose outside the influence of
traditional diversity policy, using Guaranty Trust and Hinderlider to frame the
distinction:
There is no federal statute to override either the Missouri law as to estoppel
or the Illinois law which treats respondent as a holder in due course [both of
which would result in judgment in favor of the FDIC]. Were this Court, in
the absence of federal legislation, to make its own choice of law, compare
[Guaranty Trust] and [Hinderlider], decided the same day as [Erie], Illinois or
Missouri law would furnish the governing principles.110

Frankfurter ends this passage by citing to a series of early post-Erie cases,
including Jackson County, in which the Court had found that federal law was
controlling but incorporated state law by reference to provide the governing
standard.111 For Justice Frankfurter, in other words, the proposition that a
federal court operating outside the policies of the general diversity statute
might develop independent choice-of-law rules was a direct extension of
federal rulings that referee the competing policies of interested states
Id. at 455-56 (citations omitted).
See id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Whether the case is governed by the law of one state
or the other, or by ‘federal common law’ drawn here from one state or the other, the result is the same.”).
110 Id. at 463-64.
111 See id. at 464 (citing, inter alia, Jackson County, Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States,
313 U.S. 289 (1941)).
108
109
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(Hinderlider) and absorb state law as a matter of federal common law to reduce
intersystem friction (Jackson County). The implication—a step beyond what
Frankfurter wrote—is that each may play a role when the policies of the
general diversity statute do not control.
Four years later, in a remarkable passage in Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green,112 the Court explored the relationship between choice of
law and federal jurisdictional policy even more explicitly. The appeal in
Vanston Bondholders arose from a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankrupt entity,
Inland Gas, had defaulted on a mortgage bond. The holder of the bond
demanded payment of the principal, interest on the principal, and interest on
the unpaid interest. At issue in the case was whether the court should order
payment of interest on interest, particularly when doing so would leave other
creditors unpaid. The lower federal courts believed that Erie required them
to answer this question with reference to state law, which meant either
Kentucky or New York law. The court of appeals noted that the question
whether Klaxon controlled in a case not governed by the general diversity
statute remained open and it looked to Kentucky precedents and to some of
the Supreme Court’s pre-Erie cases on choice of law in conducting its analysis,
concluding that both called for the application of New York law, which would
invalidate the payment.113
The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The Court
acknowledged the proposition that the validity and enforceability of
creditors’ claims against a bankrupt entity must be measured against state law
in the absence of a federal rule. “In determining what claims are allowable
and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed,” however, the Court held that
“a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits.”114 The
holding in Erie was an expression of the jurisdictional policy associated with
the general diversity statute, the Court explained, and had no application in
bankruptcy.115 In the Bankruptcy Act, Congress granted federal courts the
authority “to determine how and what claims shall be allowable on equitable
principles.”116 The Court went on to reaffirm several pre-Erie precedents and
held that the payment of interest on interest would not be equitable in this
case.
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
See In re Am. Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 470, 475-79 (6th Cir. 1945) (reviewing past
opinions and concluding that “[t]he most that has been developed from such investigation is conflict.
We have found no guidance to decision save in the opinions of the highest court of New York.”),
aff ’d on other grounds, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). The Supreme Court gives a somewhat oversimplified
account of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning. See Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 160-61 (discussing the
circuit court’s holding).
114 Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 162.
115 Id. at 162-63.
116 Id.
112
113
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This holding rendered it unnecessary for the Court to address the lower
court’s application of Klaxon to the proceedings. But the Court addressed the
issue nonetheless in an extended passage worth reproducing in its entirety:
What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the
bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed, is a question which, in
the absence of overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state
law. But obligations, such as the one here for interest, often have significant
contacts in many states, so that the question of which particular state’s law
should measure the obligation seldom lends itself to simple solution. In
determining which contact is the most significant in a particular transaction,
courts can seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the
conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment
in the balancing of all the interests of the state with the most significant
contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the
policies of those states. Certainly the part of this transaction which touched
New York, namely, that the indenture contract was written, signed, and
payable there, may be a reason why that state’s law should govern. But
apparently the bonds were sold to people all over the nation. And Kentucky’s
interest in having its own laws govern the obligation cannot be minimized.
For the property mortgaged was there; the company’s business was chiefly
there; its products were widely distributed there; and the prices paid by
Kentuckians for those products would depend, at least to some extent, on the
stability of the company as affected by the carrying charges on its debts. But
we need not decide which, if either, of these two states’ laws govern [sic] the
creation and subsistence and validity of the obligation for interest on interest
here involved. For assuming, arguendo, that the obligation for interest on
interest is valid under the law of New York, Kentucky, and the other states
having some interest in the indenture transaction, we would still have to
decide whether allowance of the claim would be compatible with the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act.117

There is much to observe about this passage. Framing the problem as a
dispute among states possessing “significant contacts” that must be
“balance[d] . . . in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties
to the policies of those states” represents a categorical departure from the
jurisdiction–selecting rules of the vested rights approach to choice of law that
predominated in Kentucky, and in every other state at this time. In this
respect, the Court appears to have taken up the suggestion of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which urged the Court to disregard the conflicts
rules of Kentucky and instead adopt an alternative rule of reference under
117

Id. at 161-62 (footnote and citations omitted).

2017]

Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy

1877

which the claim would be allowed so long as “the covenant would . . . be
upheld in the courts of any State ‘having a substantial relationship to the
transaction.’”118 Despite the formal separation that the Court drew between
the enforceability of the covenant under state law and the federal rule that
governs the distribution of assets in bankruptcy, its discussion of the choiceof-law question as involving a balance of the equities among the parties in
light of the policies of the interested states appears to have been influenced
strongly by the purposes animating the Bankruptcy Act itself.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Frankfurter chastised the majority for
declaiming so broadly on the choice-of-law issues and succumbing to the
“beguiling tendency” of conflicts “problems . . . to be made even more
complicated than they are.”119 He provided a characteristically clear and
precise account of the relationship between federal rules of claim
administration in bankruptcy and the enforceability of underlying obligations
under state law. As to choice of law, he limited his discussion to a few short
sentences, indicating that the Court need not have reviewed the decision of
the Sixth Circuit on that question in resolving the dispute.120 Even so, in the
brief passage in which he speaks to the issue, Justice Frankfurter, too,
disregards the choice-of-law rules of Kentucky altogether in identifying the law of
the state that would govern the enforceability of the disputed covenant.121
Id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the briefs of the SEC).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 172.
Frankfurter’s approach to the question may have been influenced by what appears to be an
aggressive view about the constitutional limits on the ability of any state other than New York to
apply its laws to the question:
118
119
120
121

The covenant for interest on interest was entered into by the parties in New York. The
dominant place of performance was also New York. In the circumstances, if the words
of the indenture created an obligation, they did so only if the law of New York says
they did. Williston, Contracts § 1792. If New York outlawed such a covenant neither
Kentucky nor Delaware nor the States in which the bonds were sold or where
bondholders reside could give effect to an obligation which never came into being.
Compare John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178.
Id. at 171.
In Yates, the Court (per Justice Brandeis) had held that Georgia violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause when it applied Georgia law to deny enforcement to a contract made and enforceable
in New York, even though the complaining party had relocated to Georgia, because most of the
relevant events at the time of contracting were centered in New York (and none were centered in
Georgia). See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183 (1936) (holding that “faith
and credit must be given to its provisions as fully as if the materiality of this specific
misrepresentation . . . had been declared by a judgment of a New York court.”). The Court would
later cut back significantly on the holding of Yates, essentially limiting that case to the proposition
that a post-occurrence change of residence, without more, cannot support the application of the law
of the new residence. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(holding that Yates did not govern the Court’s decision in Allstate). Even at the time, however,
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Vanston Bondholders, D’Oench, Duhme and the other cases discussed in this
subsection did not set forth controlling principles for the resolution of
choice-of-law disputes in suits governed by a jurisdictional policy other than that
embodied in the general diversity statute. But those cases do make one thing clear.
Ten years after the Court’s decision in Erie, the issue remained wide open.
C. Federal Common Law and Klaxon
When Klaxon is considered in the light of the rulings issued during the
decade following Erie, a picture emerges of a decision with more limited scope
and more discrete purposes than the received account of the ruling suggests.
There is no reason to think that the Court intended Klaxon to be the final word
on the role of federal courts in the promulgation of choice-of-law rules.
The dispute in Klaxon involved a question of characterization. The parties
had entered into a contract for the sale of a business in which the purchasing
party agreed to use best efforts “to further the manufacture and sale of certain
patented devices.”122 Things did not go well, the disappointed party sued in
Delaware federal court, and the jury returned a verdict of $100,000. The
plaintiff then sought an award of interest on the judgment and the question
arose whether the availability of interest should be governed by the law of
Delaware (the forum) or the law of New York (which had controlled the rights
of the parties under the contract). A characterization of the issue as
“procedural” would lead to the application of Delaware law; “substantive”
would mean New York. The lower courts applied general conflicts principles
to the question rather than looking to Delaware choice of law and found that
New York law applied.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions that the
lower courts determine what law Delaware state courts would apply. The
entirety of its analysis explaining that ruling is contained in the following
paragraph:
We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in [Erie], against such
independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of
conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court
in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.
Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb
equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of
uniformity within a state upon which the Tompkins decision is based.
Justice Frankfurter’s citation to Yates was an aggressive one, since the transaction in Vanston
Bondholders had a strong contemporaneous nexus to Kentucky.
122 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 494 (1941).
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Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in
different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state,
within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local
policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts
to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent “general law” of
conflict of laws. Subject only to review by this Court on any federal question
that may arise, Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be
governed by the law of the forum or some other law. This Court’s views are
not the decisive factor in determining the applicable conflicts rule. And the
proper function of the Delaware federal court is to ascertain what the state
law is, not what it ought to be.123

In a footnote, the Court noted with approval a recent decision by the
First Circuit, Sampson v. Channell, which had reached the same conclusion.124
This was the Court’s first extended statement on choice of law following
Erie and one of its primary tasks was to foreclose a potential avenue by which
lower federal courts might circumvent Erie’s core holding by continuing to
employ independent judgment in an area of law where the line between
liability rules and the independent prerogatives of the forum could be difficult
to define. The Court’s contemporaneous rulings on the equity powers of the
federal courts provide a useful point of comparison in this regard.
In Ruhlin, Russell and Guaranty Trust, the Court grappled in stages with
the status of federal equity practice following Erie. Within weeks of the
decision in Erie, Ruhlin issued the broad and unqualified pronouncement that
suits in equity, like suits at common law, were controlled by Erie as a matter
of “power” and hence must be governed by state law.125 This ruling parallels
the first line of the Court’s analysis in Klaxon, where the Court held that the
core Erie ruling applies to choice of law as a categorical matter. The quasisubstantive nature of equity practice had threatened to act as an invitation for
federal courts to continue shaping the primary rights and duties of litigants
according to general law principles even following Erie, a possibility that the
Ruhlin Court acted quickly to prevent. Just so in Klaxon, where the Court
eliminates any doubt as to whether Erie applies to conflicts questions at all.
In Russell v. Todd, decided two years after Ruhlin, the danger of
circumventing state liability rules was not present—the rights and duties of

Id. at 496-97 (footnote and citations omitted).
Id. at 496 n.2 (citing Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 759-62 (1st Cir. 1940)). Sampson
was a fractured opinion, with the author of the lead opinion writing only for himself, a second
member of the panel concurring only in the result, and the third dissenting.
125 See Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938) (noting that “[t]he decision in
[Erie] . . . settles the question of power. The subject is now to be governed, even in the absence of
state statute, by the decisions of the appropriate state court.”).
123
124
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the parties were defined by federal statute, and federal jurisdiction did not
depend on the general diversity statute. The Russell Court took that occasion
to reassert the independent remedial prerogatives of the federal courts,
pronouncing that the Rules of Decision Act as it then existed did “not apply
to suits in equity”126 and hence that the timeliness of an equity proceeding
would be assessed under the federal doctrine of laches.127 “The test of the
inadequacy of the legal remedy prerequisite to resort to a federal court of
equity is the legal remedy which federal rather than state courts afford,” the
Court said, and “the jurisdiction of federal courts of equity, as determined by
that test, is neither enlarged nor diminished by the names given to remedies
or the distinction made between them by state practice.”128 Although the
Court went on to hold that the laches doctrine should often look to state law
as a point of reference when determining the timeliness of a request for a
federal equitable remedy, it made a point of framing that proposition as a
matter of federal remedial policy.129 It took five more years for the Court in
Guaranty Trust to disaggregate and state clearly the elements of this question
that it had been conflating in earlier rulings: (1) the source of the law that
provides the governing liability or regulatory rule in an equity proceeding;
(2) the power of the federal courts to promulgate independent judge-made
rules on remedial and procedural matters; and (3) the role that jurisdictional
policy plays in striking a balance between federal and state prerogatives.
Guaranty Trust provided the coherent guidance for the proper role of federal
equity practice in different types of cases that had been lacking. The movement
from Ruhlin to Russell to Guaranty Trust marked a passage from broad
pronouncement to qualification and retrenchment to fully realized explanation
on the question of federal equity powers under the Erie doctrine.130
At the time Klaxon was decided, the Court was, so to speak, still at the
Ruhlin stage of this progression. The threat that conflicts doctrine posed to
the core holding of Erie was perhaps not as great as that posed by equity
practice, since choice of law putatively requires a selection among state
liability regimes rather than the independent definition of the parties’ rights
that equity could entail. Still, the characterization of doctrines as “procedural”
rather than “substantive”—the type of dispute that gave rise to both Klaxon
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 286.
See id. at 288-91.
Professor Hart draws this connection in a glancing fashion in the article in which he framed
his critical response to Klaxon. Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512 n.76 (1954) (noting “[t]wo of the most influential, but interestingly
different, statements of the governing criterion” for eliminating forum shopping in Klaxon and
Guaranty Trust).
126
127
128
129
130

2017]

Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy

1881

and Sampson—gave courts leeway in shaping and defining the rights of
parties, and the Court clearly wanted to yoke federal diversity courts firmly
to state policy to prevent mischief in general diversity cases.131 The Klaxon
Court’s observation about the “lack of uniformity this may produce between
federal courts in different states” closely tracks the description the Ruhlin
Court provided three years earlier of the change that Erie would occasion in
the Court’s certiorari policy.132 And the Klaxon Court’s reference to the
federal policy of diversity jurisdiction—“the principle of uniformity within a
state upon which the Tompkins decision is based”—reflects the passage of
those three years and the gradual incorporation of considerations of
jurisdictional policy under the general diversity statute into the Court’s
analysis, as was evident in Russell and Guaranty Trust.133
Also at play in 1941 was the Supreme Court’s relationship with lower
courts in scrutinizing choice-of-law determinations. The Court’s involvement
in choice of law was undergoing a significant change during this period. The
1930s brought a series of decisions in which the Court defined more aggressive
constitutional limitations on state choice of law, raising the prospect of a
significantly increased federal role in supervising state choice-of-law policy.
Given the timing of the Erie decision, there was the potential for federal
courts to replace the substantial role they had played in defining choice of law
under the general common law of Swift with a similar role under a newly
robust constitutional doctrine.
By the close of that decade, however, the Court was retreating from any
such expansion of its role, interpreting the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Clauses with increasing deference to state prerogatives. In Klaxon
itself, the plaintiff had argued that the application of forum law instead of
New York law to the question of interest on the judgment would violate full
131 Professor Roosevelt points out that characterization issues, while not uncommon in disputes
during this period, are an anomalous type of problem in choice of law and that lends itself more
readily to the kind of formalistic approach that the Court took in Klaxon:

Klaxon is a decision about the status of choice-of-law rules under Erie, but it features
the esoteric and somewhat confusing example of substance-procedure
characterization. Characterization is a persistent problem in choice of law, but it is not
the main focus. Instead, choice-of-law rules primarily do two things, corresponding to
the two steps of the model set out earlier. First, choice-of-law rules set the scope of
state law. They determine who can claim rights under state law—what people, where,
and in what circumstances. In this function, they are what I call “rules of scope.”
Second, they resolve conflicts between state laws. They determine which of two
conflicting rights under different states’ laws will prevail. In this function, they are
what I call “rules of priority.”
Roosevelt, infra note 141, at 18.
132 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
133 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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faith and credit, but the Court rejected the argument out of hand.134 The
Court’s simple, short and broadly worded ruling in Klaxon was consistent with
the determination it had apparently made during this period to get the federal
courts out of the choice-of-law business in mine-run diversity cases.135
In the decades following Klaxon, the Court has lost sight of the limited
scope of its 1941 ruling and the careful reservations it made at the time about
the impact of jurisdictional policy on choice of law in the federal courts,
instead treating Klaxon as a categorical doctrine admitting of no exceptions.
In Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, for example, the Court reviewed a ruling
of the Fifth Circuit that had grappled with the choice of applicable law in a
diversity case between American citizens arising out of an injury suffered in
Cambodia while U.S. military forces were engaged in armed combat with
North Vietnam.136 Declining to recognize the potential impact of federal
interests and international law on a dispute of this character, the Court
summarily reversed in a per curiam opinion without hearing argument,
finding that its holding in Klaxon applied “by parity of reasoning” because
this was “a diversity case” and no further analysis was required.137 This
desuetude has occurred in the name of federalism, but it is a misplaced and
unthinking species of federalism that has failed to give proper voice to
significant federal interests.

134 See id. at 497-98 (“Nothing in the Constitution ensures unlimited extraterritorial
recognition of all statutes or of any statute under all circumstances”).
135 On the same day that it issued its decision in Klaxon, the Court also handed down
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), a life insurance dispute in which the insurance company
initiated a federal interpleader proceeding to determine which among several competing claimants
were entitled to payment. As the case came before the Court, the remaining dispute involved the
estate and one claimant, and the resolution of the dispute depended on whether the law of New York
or Texas would govern. With no attention to the role of the interpleader statute in defining the
jurisdictional policies that govern such a proceeding, the Court treated the dispute as a simple
“diversity of citizenship case[]” and applied its sibling ruling in Klaxon without further analysis.
McCoach, 313 U.S. at 503.
McCoach has long been criticized by Conflicts scholars for treating the interpleader proceeding
before it as indistinguishable from a generic diversity action. The interpleader statute includes a
targeted grant of jurisdiction that embodies policies distinct from those in the general diversity
statute. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2063-66 (2008) (analyzing the jurisdictional policies of the
interpleader statute). An extended critique of McCoach will have to wait for future work, but the
interpleader statute is a strong candidate for the mode of analysis I develop here.
136 Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam), reversing Challoner
v. Day & Zimmerman, 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975). I thank Steve Burbank for bringing this
case to my attention.
137 Id. at 4.
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II. CHOICE OF LAW AND KLAXON TODAY
With the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act and the expanded
use of the MDL statute, the federal courts must reengage. CAFA rejects the
policy of federal jurisdiction bound up in the general diversity statute,
replacing it with an invitation to litigants to shop for a federal forum in order
to obtain a different result in service of targeted federal goals.138 The
jurisdictional policy of the general diversity statute does not control in such
cases, and neither does the holding of Klaxon. Klaxon and Erie do still stand
for the proposition that state law must define the primary rights, duties and
obligations of the parties in this class of cases. That element of the Erie
doctrine reflects limitations on the power of the federal courts that have
constitutional foundations. But Klaxon does not foreclose the development of
a federal rule of decision in resolving conflicts between the local policies of
interested states. Such conflicts present a question of interstate relations that
is particularly appropriate for federal resolution. Hinderlider,
Vanston Bondholders, and D’Oench, Duhme together invite a fresh examination
of the proper role of independent federal choice-of-law standards under the
new jurisdictional regime of the federal class action.
Professor Linda Silberman has done some of the leading work mapping
the significance of choice of law for aggregate litigation and the impact that
choice-of-law rules can have in either facilitating or limiting class
certification.139 She makes a case for uniform federal choice-of-law rules in
disputes that come into federal court via the Class Action Fairness Act,
drawing on the broad purposes of the Act and its goal of defeating
opportunistic forum shopping.140 Though I do not share all of her conclusions,
the intellectual history set forth in the previous Part and the methodological
analysis that follows seek to offer a scaffolding for the type of argument that
Professor Silberman explores, which will be an increasing focus of attention
in coming years.

138 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act in Historical Context, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1439, 1528 (2008) (“With eyes not blinded by fictions, the reason for federal subject matter
jurisdiction in such a case might seem to be a desire to give the corporate defendants a choice to
seek, not a neutral forum, but a more favorable forum.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924 (2006) (examining
the shift in jurisdictional policy that CAFA entails).
139 See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008).
140 See generally Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions:
Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54 (2009).
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A. Choice of Law and Federal Common Law in the Modern Era
The general methodology for analyzing choice of law in light of changing
federal jurisdictional policies begins with a more careful account of the
Court’s ruling in Erie. That ruling operates in two distinct modes. It expresses
principles of federalism and the separation powers that limit the power of
federal courts to create substantive law, and it articulates a policy of federal
jurisdiction that governs what powers federal diversity courts retain in their
capacity as an independent judicial system and when they should employ
those powers. These concepts map onto a core structural feature of choice of
law: the distinction between the geographic scope of state law, which is a
matter of substantive state policy, and the method of resolving conflicts when
the laws of more than one state extend their geographic reach to cover a given
dispute, which is a question of interstate relations. The interstate relations
question—the resolution of conflicts among interested states—is a federal
issue. The Klaxon Court concluded that it should incorporate a state rule of
decision to answer that question in order to satisfy the jurisdictional policies
of the general diversity statute. But the issue is federal in character.
The distinction between state substantive policy and interstate relations
in choice-of-law analysis was coming more sharply into focus in the years
surrounding Klaxon. During the 1930s, the Court reframed the constitutional
limits on state choice of law around governmental interests and the avoidance
of unfair surprise to litigants. The new paradigm marked a major shift away
from decades of prior case law in which the Court had described
constitutional limits on state choice of law as a product of the inherent limits
on a state’s ability to exercise legislative power outside its territorial
boundaries. That earlier doctrine also informed Pennoyer v. Neff, which
described the constitutional limits on state adjudicatory jurisdiction as a
necessary concomitant to limits on state legislative power, and it became
entwined with the Court’s early due process rulings on the limits of state
police power in the period leading up to the Lochner era.
This shift toward a constitutional doctrine of state interests and fairness
prefigured the cognate shift in choice of law among the states in the second
half of the twentieth century. Ideas of state interest and fairness had always
been present when choice of law was framed in terms of territorial power and
vested rights. Those concepts had never been developed into a fully realized
approach to choice-of-law analysis; rather, they occupied a peripheral role,
serving an explanatory or critiquing function. The constitutional cases
provided a more fully realized vocabulary for the development of
comprehensive choice-of-law systems around these values. At the same time,
they gave states de facto encouragement to adopt approaches to choice of law
in which the points of reference for selecting the applicable law would
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harmonize with the points of reference for determining whether the law
selected was constitutionally permissible. A large majority of states have now
adopted approaches to choice of law that are framed around state interests
and fairness, and the few states that hold onto lex loci approaches must do so
within those constitutional strictures.
With this reframing of choice of law, a common analytical thread now
runs through the modern approaches: choice of law distinguishes between the
geographic scope of a state law and the method for selecting the applicable
law when two or more states would apply their law to a dispute. In the
scholarly literature, Professor Kramer has articulated the distinction most
clearly. He explains that the geographic scope of a law—the physical locations
where the state intends its law to apply—is an element of the law’s substantive
content in the same way as the elements specifying the people or entities that
the law will regulate or the activities it will cover:
A lawsuit with multistate contacts is still just a lawsuit: the plaintiff still alleges
that because something happened, he is entitled to a remedy; the court must still
determine whether the facts alleged are true, and whether, if these facts are true,
some rule of positive law confers a right to recover. Making this determination is
still a problem of interpretation. The only difference is that some of the facts are
connected to different states, and the court must determine if that affects whether
the law or laws at issue confer a right. While this determination may be difficult,
it does not alter the nature of the problem confronting the court, which remains
to decide what rights are conferred by positive law.141

The method for resolving conflicts, in contrast, involves a policy of
interstate relations. When two or more states extend their laws to cover a
dispute—when the laws of multiple states overlap in geographic scope as well
as subject matter—then there is a clash of authority within our federal system.
The resolution of that clash implicates the administration of power among
states. Left to their own devices, of course, states come up with ways of
resolving those disputes. When they do, they are making interstate relations
law in the absence of federal direction.142

141 Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 290 (1990). Professor Kim
Roosevelt, who serves as the Reporter for the ALI Project on the Third Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws, has long embraced this account of choice of law and has provided an account of Erie and
the Klaxon doctrine that is broadly in line with the analysis that follows. See generally
Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie to Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
142 My approach here is consistent with that developed by Professor Roosevelt. See
Roosevelt, supra note 141, at 16-23. Professor Roosevelt gives much greater attention to the
practical implementation of his approach than I do to mine. As I indicate below, that task
remains for me in future work.
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These distinct components of choice of law implicate distinct components
of the Erie doctrine. The geographic scope of state law is a matter of internal
state policy and so is the sole prerogative of the states. This is the
constitutional dimension of Erie, which recognizes the quasi-sovereign status
of states and their role as authoritative expositors of their own substantive
policies. The federal government has no power to alter the contents of those
state policies. Federal law can constrain or displace state law in many ways,
but it cannot modify the internal content of state law.143 In contrast, the
interstate relations question of how to resolve a conflict among multiple state
laws that all purport to govern the same dispute is distinctively federal. It is
analogous to the resolution of competing state-law claims over the flow of
interstate rivers that was addressed in Hinderlider—a clash of conflicting state
interests arising from overlapping extensions of state law. These are questions
of coordination, aptly described in a passage from another dispute over an
interstate waterway that the Hinderlider Court embraced.
New York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its
jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of the
interest of lower States could not be tolerated. And, on the other hand,
equally little could New Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up
its power altogether in order that the river might come down to it
undiminished. Both States have real and substantial interests in the River
that must be reconciled as best they may.144

As its first act of clarification in specifying the sources of controlling law
following Erie, the Hinderlider Court indicated that such questions of
resolving conflicts among competing exercises of state authority are the
subject of federal common law.
When the general diversity statute is the basis for federal jurisdiction,
Klaxon and Guaranty Trust hold that the federal common-law power to answer
such questions must be balanced against the policies that are distinctive to
general diversity: avoidance of results-oriented forum shopping and arbitrary
differences in outcome between diverse and non-diverse litigants. Klaxon
answered that balance of policies by incorporating forum-state choice of law
by reference. As the Court had put the matter two years earlier, “the state law
has been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state
law was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was

143 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not
commandeer state legislative processes and compel States to enact specific laws).
144 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 103 (1938) (quoting
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931)).
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not deemed inconsistent with federal policy.”145 In the case of Klaxon, the
Court found the absorption of state law to be mandated by the policies of the
general diversity statute.
In the seventy-five years since Klaxon, the interstate judicial system has
produced reasons to question the wisdom of that answer in general diversity
cases.146 The proliferation of approaches to choice of law and the preference
that many courts exhibit for the law of the forum produced rampant
horizontal forum shopping that a uniform approach to choice of law in federal
diversity courts might have diminished, though the Court’s radical reform of
general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman147 may now mitigate that
problem significantly.148 But whatever its wisdom, Klaxon’s answer was always
driven by jurisdictional policy.
Now that Congress has enacted a substantially different policy of federal
jurisdiction in CAFA, it becomes necessary to revisit the interstate relations
question in choice of law. D’Oench, Duhme indicated as much shortly after
Klaxon was decided, and Vanston Bondholders framed the appropriate mode of
analysis. Vanston Bondholders distinguished between the nature and validity of
competing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding (analogous to determining
questions of geographic scope in a choice-of-law dispute) and the resolution
of conflicting claims of equitable priority (analogous to resolving a conflict
among competing state laws).149 The former had to be controlled by state law.
145 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939) (citing Brown
v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923)).
146 Major figures in the fields of conflicts and federal courts began framing the standard
critiques in the middle part of the twentieth century. Professor Hart questioned the content of
the federal policy that would demand strict adherence to state choice of law in federal diversity
cases. Hart, supra note 130, at 514 n.86 (“It is difficult to understand what federal policy required,
in Klaxon, the denial to a New York plaintiff forced to bring suit in Delaware of interest on a
verdict which the New York and perhaps other state courts would have allowed, merely because
Delaware state courts would not have allowed it.”). Professor Baxter staked out an aggressive
position that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing legislation ex proprio vigore
called for a uniform approach to choice of law that would control in federal courts and state courts
alike. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1963)
(“At least after Erie, the full-faith-and-credit clause should have been interpreted to dictate the
initial choice-of-law reference in every case, whether in a state or federal court.”).
147 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014) (rejecting the “doing-business”
standard of general jurisdiction and adopting a more restrictive approach that measures a corporate
defendant’s relative contacts in each state and permits general jurisdiction only where the
corporation is most “at home”—a standard typically met only where the defendant is incorporated
or has its principal place of business).
148 See generally Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and its
Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675 (2015).
149 The relevant passage from Vanston Bondholders reads:

What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at
the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law . . . . In
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The latter was governed not by state choice of law but by the distinctive
policies of the controlling federal bankruptcy statute. As the next Section
explains, the Class Action Fairness Act calls for a similar analysis.
B. Jurisdictional Policy and the Class Action Fairness Act
CAFA substantially expands the scope of diversity jurisdiction over class
actions and similar proceedings. The statute authorizes jurisdiction based on
an aggregate amount in controversy of five million dollars and minimal
diversity (subject to narrow exceptions) while eliminating barriers to removal
so that class actions filed in state court can more readily be brought to federal
court.150 It is the largest targeted expansion of diversity that Congress has
enacted, and the change in statutory text carries with it a shift in jurisdictional
policy that departs significantly from the general diversity statute.
Case law describing the jurisdictional policy of the general diversity
statute has always rested on spare textual foundations. The diversity clause in
Article III was not the subject of any recorded discussion in the
Constitutional Convention151 and much of the criticism of the clause during
the ratification debates involved a fear that never materialized: the
assumption that the subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts and federal
courts would be mutually exclusive rather than concurrent.152 The proposition
that diversity was necessary to protect out-of-state litigants from bias in state
courts emerged as a post-hoc explanation153 and has translated to only a few
determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed,
a bankruptcy court does not apply the state where it sits. Erie . . . has no such
implication.
329 U.S. 156, 162 (footnote and citations omitted).
150 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2012).
151 See Friendly, supra note 15, at 484-87 (describing the limited nature of the record of debate
over diversity jurisdiction in the Constitutional Convention).
152 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing that state courts would
retain concurrent jurisdiction over cases that fell within the diversity grant of Article III); Friendly,
supra note 15, at 487-504 (surveying debates over the federal courts in state conventions).
153 Chief Justice Marshall’s classic statement, characterizing diversity jurisdiction as a response
to “apprehensions” about local bias that the Constitution “indulges,” appears in the opinion by which
the Court opened the doors of diversity to corporate litigants through a judicially crafted fiction
about the putative citizenship of shareholders.
A constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in detail. Its framers cannot
perceive minute distinctions which arise in the progress of the nation, and therefore
confine it to the establishment of broad and general principles.
The judicial department was introduced into the American constitution under
impressions, and with views, which are too apparent not to be perceived by all.
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice
as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true
that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views
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minor elements of the statutory framework over the years.154 Rather, as
Professor Purcell has explained, diversity policy has always been a judicial
creation with the occasional congressional ratification or adjustment coming
long after the course was set.155 A statute that implements a major shift in
diversity doctrine is thus a significant event, and the changes in statutory text
require a close examination of concomitant changes in underlying policy.156
The Class Action Fairness Act instructs federal courts to employ its targeted
grant of jurisdiction to protect defendants against abusive state-court
litigation, protect the interests of class members, safeguard national economic
interests, and prevent excesses of state power.157 The statute has the purpose
with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has
established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a
citizen, or between citizens of different states.
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (6 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); see also EDWARD PURCELL,
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL
AMERICA, 1870-1958 127-47 (1992) (describing the significance of Deveaux in the early
development of corporate diversity litigation); Friendly, supra note 15 (discussing this passage
in conjunction with the popular opposition to diversity during the ratification debates).
154 These are the terms prohibiting removal based on diversity by in-state defendants: 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012), which does not apply under the Class Action Fairness Act; 28 U.S.C.
§1332(d), a former term limiting diversity jurisdiction to cases involving an in-state party (which
was included in section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 but removed not long thereafter). See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars, . . . [and]
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”).
Another former term required parties to show actual bias before removing based on diversity, which
Congress enacted in 1866, see Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 558-59, but later eliminated
when it proved too difficult to administer. See also Whitney R. Harris, Survey of the Federal Judicial
Code—The 1948 Revision and First Interpretive Decisions, 3 SW. L.J. 229, 239-42 (1949) (detailing
changes to the removal statute in the 1948 amendments to Title 28 including the elimination of
removal “upon the ground that prejudice or local influence will prevent the defendant from
obtaining justice in that state court”).
155 See Purcell, supra note 153 (discussing removal based on diversity jurisdiction). The
Court recently emphasized the minimal role of the statutory text in setting the policies of the
federal arising under statute, as well. See Merrill Lynch v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1570-71
(2016) (“[T]he test for § 1331 jurisdiction is not grounded in that provision’s particular phrasing
. . . [and] does not turn on § 1331’s text.”).
156 See, e.g., Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch, supra note 138, at 1941–44 (noting the
consequences of CAFA’s impact on jurisdictional policy); Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra
note 138, at 1525–33 (discussing the fact that federal forums may be more favorable for corporate
defendants in CAFA cases).
157 See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1711 (2012)) (discussing the purposes of the CAFA amendment). See generally Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2037-39 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s statements of purpose); id. at 2054-72
(describing the significance of targeted jurisdictional grants aimed at safeguarding specific
congressional policies and analyzing the parallels between CAFA’s expansion of federal jurisdiction
and the doctrine of protective jurisdiction).

1890

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 165: 1847

and expectation that removing class actions from state to federal court will
produce different results in the adjudication of state-law claims because
federal courts will employ different certification standards and will apply the
underlying substantive law more fairly. In other words, CAFA encourages
results-oriented forum shopping. It marks a fundamental shift away from the
jurisdictional policy of the Erie doctrine.
As of this writing, the Court has made just one clear statement about the
impact of the CAFA on broader questions of jurisdictional policy in cases that
come into federal court under its provisions. That statement is small and has
no direct bearing on Erie or choice of law, but it does signal the Court’s
recognition that CAFA carries with it a distinctive set of purposes. In
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,158 the Court heard an appeal in a
CAFA case to decide what burden a defendant bears in pleading the amount
in controversy in a notice of removal. The language of the removal statute
tracks Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring a “short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal,”159 a fact that suggests that
defendant’s statement of the amount in controversy in the notice of removal
might be governed by the same “plausibility” standard that the Court recently
adopted for pleading claims. However, the Tenth Circuit and many other
lower federal courts apply a “presumption against removal” in the
administration of the removal statute, and that jurisdictional policy led some
courts (including the district court in Dart Cherokee) to conclude that removal
required an even more demanding standard than “plausibility” when
defendant alleges the prerequisites for jurisdiction. The Court rejected that
argument, concluding that the parallel between § 1446(a) and Rule 8 was
deliberate and indicated Congress’s intent to have the same standard apply.
On the “presumption against removal”—which the Court itself has
never embraced or rejected—the majority found that such a doctrine
would not affect the result even if it were assumed to exist in ordinary
diversity cases. Dart Cherokee was removed to federal court on the basis of
CAFA jurisdiction, the Court explained, and the specialized diversity
provisions of CAFA entailed a jurisdictional policy different from that of
the general diversity statute.
In remanding the case to state court, the District Court relied, in part, on a
purported “presumption” against removal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. See, e.g.,
Laughlin, 50 F.3d, at 873 (“[T]here is a presumption against removal
jurisdiction.”). We need not here decide whether such a presumption is
proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that no anti-
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28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012).

2017]

Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy

1891

removal presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted
to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court. See Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 568 U.S., at——, 133 S.Ct., at 1350 (“CAFA’s primary objective”
is to “ensur[e] ‘Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance.’ “ (quoting § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5)); S.Rep. No. 109–14, p. 43
(2005) (CAFA’s “provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference
that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly
removed by any defendant.”).160

CAFA applies a distinctive set of jurisdictional policies to cases brought
into federal court under its provisions—policies that differ from those
applicable in “mine-run diversity cases.”161 Congress both contemplated and
intended that litigants would move interstate class actions into federal court
in order to seek an outcome different from the one they could expect in state
court. Though Congress did not make federal jurisdiction exclusive and
deprive state courts of the power to hear national class actions altogether, it
enacted a jurisdictional provision that judged state courts to be inadequate
tribunals for the resolution of such disputes because of the results they
produced. In other words, CAFA encourages results-oriented vertical forum
shopping. The portions of Erie and its progeny that rest on the policies of the
general diversity statute do not hold sway in CAFA cases.
III. INSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION
The foregoing analysis describes the power of federal courts to craft
choice-of-law rules for the resolution of state-law conflicts in CAFA cases.
Congress’s decision to supersede the jurisdictional policy of the general
diversity statute brings cases governed by CAFA outside the rule of Klaxon.
160 Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554. The Court made a similar statement about CAFA in
Standard Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), though in a less conclusive manner. In Knowles,
a plaintiff attempted to defeat CAFA jurisdiction by filing in state court and stipulating that the
total amount in controversy would be less than $5,000,000 for the entire class. The Court rejected
the effort, drawing on earlier rulings involving not-yet-certified classes to hold that a putative class
representative cannot bind absent class members to a stipulation of fact. See id. at 1349 (“Neither a
proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.” (citing Smith v. Bayer Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011)); id. (“[A] nonnamed class member is [not] a party to the class-action
litigation before the class is certified.” (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16 n.1 (2002)
(Scalia, J., dissenting))). In rejecting the plaintiff ’s attempt to argue around this proposition, the
Court explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a
nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over substance, and run directly counter to
CAFA’s primary objective: ensuring ‘Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance.’” Id. at 1350 (citation omitted). The invocation of CAFA’s jurisdictional purposes is
conspicuous, but here its purpose is to reaffirm a proposition first articulated in non-CAFA class
litigation, rather than to draw a contrast with potentially applicable doctrine in non-CAFA cases.
161 Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554.
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But important questions remain to be resolved. Should federal courts employ
that power, or should they continue to incorporate state choice of law by
reference when resolving genuine conflicts in CAFA cases? If federal courts
do undertake to craft choice-of-law rules in CAFA disputes, what principles
should guide them in crafting these conflict-resolution rules? A thorough
examination of these questions must await future work. For now, I offer these
brief initial observations.
The constraint that Klaxon imposed was a product of the jurisdictional
policies of the general diversity statute. The power that federal courts have
to craft choice of law in CAFA cases is a product of the distinct policies
embodied in that more targeted grant of jurisdiction. It follows that the
policies underlying CAFA—a preference for federal certification standards
and a desire to avoid harm to “class members with legitimate claims and
defendants that have acted responsibly”—must guide whether and how
federal courts employ that power.162 Guide need not mean exclusively dictate.
CAFA is the starting point in asking whether federal courts should employ
the power to adopt their own methods for resolving conflicts of state law, but
other federal policies may influence the question. Congress created a
powerful consolidation tool in the MDL statute, for example, aiming to
promote efficiency and fairness in pre-trial proceedings when large numbers
of related cases are filed around the country. Simplification of the choice-oflaw calculus when considering dispositive motions in consolidated MDL
proceedings could promote those purposes. Determining whether federal
courts should embrace this new role will require careful attention to the entire
complex of federal policies surrounding this class of cases.
The actual task of crafting choice-of-law rules in this class of cases may
also prove difficult. A federal court must be attentive to the distinction
between the geographic scope a state gives to its law and the resolution of
genuine conflicts when more than one state would apply its law to a given
dispute. The former remains the exclusive province of the states. In some
instances, states will answer these questions of scope directly—in the text of
a statute or the construction of its law by appellate decision. But states often
do not have occasion to address questions of geographic scope, and even when
they do, they may not distinguish carefully between geographic scope and the
resolution of genuine conflicts. In a state that uses the First Restatement, for
example, the jurisdiction–selecting rules may not draw any such distinction,
requiring a difficult exercise in legal forensics to isolate questions of scope.
Professor Kramer took a first pass at investigating these questions in his work
on the subject and his insights will be helpful.163 But the imperative to
162
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The Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 5 (2005).
See Kramer, supra note 141.
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distinguish between geographic scope and the resolution of conflicts will be
even greater here, since federal courts would only have authority to speak to
the latter question.164
CONCLUSION
Klaxon has provided a simple answer to a complicated question since the
earliest days of the post-Erie era. That answer has always depended on the
jurisdictional policies of the general diversity statute. When Congress
supersedes those policies with a targeted jurisdictional provision in a
particular class of cases, Klaxon no longer controls. The Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 requires the federal courts to return to first principles on choice
of law and jurisdictional policy. Deciding whether to use the power to craft
federal choice of law in CAFA cases, and how to use that power if they do,
are questions that require more thought and study. But the power exists.

164 Professor Roosevelt makes a fine start tackling these difficult questions in one section of
his article on Erie and choice of law. See Roosevelt, supra note 141, at 40–50. Much more work remains
to be done in that vein.
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